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Abstract 
Large dollar reserves in Asian EMEs accompany large US fiscal and current 
account deficits. Analysis of strategic sales by Asian EMEs suggests that an 
attack on the dollar is not certain but is possible. A unique equilibrium where 
Asian EMEs sell their reserves does not exist but there are multiple Nash 
equilibria. Therefore action, which includes adjustment, is required to coordinate 
to the better equilibrium. There is evidence that more flexibility in Asian 
exchange rates will reduce risk for Asian EMEs, but the flexibility will have to be 
limited, and it depends on more flexibility in the renminbi. Moreover, limits to 
adjustment in wages put limits on realignments between US and Asian exchange 
rates. Therefore while a gradual adjustment strategy is feasible it will require both 
expenditure switching and expenditure reduction, with the latter moderated by the 
maintenance of robust global growth. 
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Imbalances have built up across countries and regions in foreign exchange 
reserves. The U.S. has a large current account and fiscal deficit and many Asian 
emerging market economies (EMEs) have a surplus in the current account of their 
balance of payments (BOP) with continuing capital inflows. They are 
accumulating substantial reserves to prevent their currencies from appreciating. 
We ask first, if adjustment is required, second, if it is possible. If so, should it be 
one-sided or balanced, gradual or sudden?    
Dooley et. al (2004) argue the situation is sustainable since the world is 
back to a de-facto Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, where the 
development strategy the Asian periphery is following requires it to keep its 
exchange rates undervalued to access the large U.S. market, while Asian Central 
Banks (CBs) make cheap funds available to fund U.S. imports. Large reserves 
invested in U.S. treasuries help to keep U.S. interest rates low. Asian EMEs 
benefit since they are able to grow more rapidly. Thus the current system can 
continue until surplus labor in Asia is absorbed. 
Many commentators counter this position; most are of the opinion that 
some adjustment will have to occur. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) estimate that a 
20-40 percent depreciation of the dollar is required to balance the U.S. current 
account.1  Eichengreen (2004) expects Asian CBs to stop holding dollar assets as 
depreciation reduces returns from doing so, and to allow their currencies and 
wages to appreciate. He points out the many ways in which U.S. deficits are 
worse than they were during the Bretton Woods period. He believes, moreover, 
that coordinated Asian action in support of the dollar, even if desirable, will not 
occur. Asian EMEs will not be able to act together since they suffer from a 
collective action problem.   
We argue that adjustment is required since imbalances make markets 
vulnerable. Although our focus is on Asia and the U.S., stress in Europe from 
appreciation of the Euro, can contribute to instability in global financial markets.2 
Our analysis of strategic actions and possible coordination among Asian 
economies suggests that an attack on the dollar is not certain but it is possible. A 
collective action failure, which would imply a unique outcome where Asian 
countries sell their reserves, is unlikely. But there are multiple Nash equilibria 
with attack and hold both as possible equilibria. A coordination failure can lead to 
                                                 
1 By the end of 2004 the dollar had already fallen 37% against the euro and 24% against the yen 
compared to early 2002. 
2 I thank a referee for making this point. He also suggested the potential problems from the large 
private holdings of dollar-denominated financial claims. All these do add to the vulnerability of 
markets and underline the necessity of some adjustment. Even so, large reserves give CBs some 
ability to lead markets.  
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an attack on the dollar. Therefore action, including adjustment, is required to 
coordinate to the equilibrium where CBs continue to hold the dollar.  
The next question is about the kind of adjustment. Arguments based on the 
use of asymmetric power imply that adjustment can be one-sided—the U.S. need 
not adjust. It can, as it has in the past, use its position as the global hegemon to 
force other countries to share the cost of its current account adjustment. Dollar 
depreciation is a “weapon” (Hennings, 2004) that was used in earlier adjustment 
episodes to force Europe to expand domestic demand to stimulate U.S. exports 
and thus support the dollar. Today Asian EMEs with large dollar holdings are 
vulnerable, because their reserves will lose value if the dollar depreciates. Since 
beginning to sell may bring about such a collapse, they may be locked into 
holding the dollar reserves. Senators were ready with a bill to impose a 27.5 
percent tax on Chinese imports unless Beijing revalued by as much, but agreed in 
June 2005 to delay a vote on the bill after the U.S. administration persuaded them 
that a change was imminent. On July 21 China did revalue but by 2.1 percent 
compared to the 10 percent the U.S. government wanted, and the 40 percent 
overvaluation their trade competitors were alleging.3
As Goyal (2005) points out, blame is a psychological trap that prevents 
resolution of international issues such as the current global imbalances. It is 
always the others fault, and it is always the other who should take action. Thus the 
U.S. blames Asian depreciated exchange rates and low wages; Asia emphasizes 
U.S. deficits. Pushing the other to take action results in resistance; China has 
often said it would like to change its exchange rate regime, but when it is ready. It 
would not like to be seen as doing this under international pressure. Pushing may 
work if the advantages are all on one side, but in a more even situation, only 
results in a stalemate. These distortions arise due to biased perceptions. People 
tend to see their own losses and other peoples gains. Thus the U.S. debate 
emphasizes competition for industry from Asian exports more than the benefits to 
consumers from cheap imports or from low interest rates; Asians point to U.S. 
deficits but neglect the demand these create for Asian goods. Fear or tendency to 
expect the worst worsens the biases and prevents a reasoned approach to an 
acceptable solution. A shared balanced adjustment can dissolve these traps, and 
act as a confidence building measure. 
Moreover, a balanced adjustment is necessary since it is not possible to 
adjust either relative exchange rates or U.S. fiscal deficits to the degree required 
without destabilizing the system.  Analysis with the Swan diagram shows there 
are limits to the appreciation of Asian exchange rates, unless real wages rise. 
Appreciation of the domestic currency implies lower domestic prices and, if there 
are lags in the adjustment of nominal wages, real wages rise. But for the latter to 
                                                 
3 The information was obtained from news reports and the press release of the People’s Bank of 
China, July 2005. 
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be sustained surplus labor has to be absorbed, and the agricultural sector has to 
become more productive. Then the reservation wages of the large numbers 
employed at low productivity jobs would rise; options available to them would 
improve. Without that they would bid down wages and prices. In addition, too 
sharp an appreciation of Asian exchange rates would either export inflation to the 
West or require a large reduction in real wages there, which may result in political 
resistance. Even if it were feasible, it would worsen already growing inequalities 
in income distribution. Moreover, U.S. export demand is a large part of world 
trade. If dollar depreciation results in a sharp fall in this demand, world prices 
would fall and thus reduce real dollar depreciation despite a nominal depreciation. 
Too sharp a dollar depreciation would also reduce demand for it as a reserve 
currency. 
We argue that gradual adjustment is possible since there are sufficient 
common interests to motivate a feasible path with shared costs of adjustment. 
Such adjustment may calm markets and lower the possibility of coordination 
failure. It would also use and preserve current higher global growth rates, and 
therefore be more feasible politically. In the new Chinese exchange regime the 
renminbi is limited to moving within a 0.3 percent band each day against a basket 
of foreign currencies. The tight dollar peg has been dropped. But even though 
China has officially been on a managed float since 1994, the CB intervened to 
maintain a tight dollar peg. The new regime does not in itself guarantee an end to 
the earlier type of intervention. 
How will some appreciation of the renminbi, and a move to limited 
exchange rate flexibility affect China? To answer this question we draw on 
stylized facts developed from an examination of macro and trade data for select 
Asian EMEs. China is said to be hesitant to allow greater flexibility for a number 
of reasons. First, it is afraid its Asian trade competitors will not follow an 
appreciation. But our stylized facts show Asian countries have allowed their 
currencies to appreciate against the renminbi. It follows they will not start 
depreciating against the dollar, if the renminbi appreciates somewhat. Therefore 
trade competition among Asian EMEs will not be affected. For example, when 
China dropped its tight dollar peg, Malaysia also said it would drop its dollar peg. 
Moreover, intra-Asian trade is substantial, and does not benefit from a 
depreciation of Asian currencies against the dollar. A relative appreciation of the 
renminbi can actually lower the cost of China’s raw material imports and foreign 
asset acquisition. Although explicit monetary cooperation may be far in the 
future, there may already be an implicit alignment among Asian exchange rates, 
which may persist even with a more flexible renminbi.   
China is also worried about the impact of a change in exchange rates on its 
weak financial system. But all Asian EMEs including China want deeper and 
more modern financial markets. More flexible exchange rates help to develop 
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such markets. There is evidence that more flexibility in Asian exchange rates 
reduces risk taking, thus benefiting Asian EMEs (Goyal and Agarwal, 2005). But 
the flexibility will have to be limited, because the forex markets are not deep 
enough for a full float. India’s experience since the mid-nineties shows that 
limited flexibility of exchange rates is feasible even in the context of massive 
capital inflows.   
Since fixed exchange rates were identified as a cause of the 1997 East 
Asian currency crisis most Asian EMEs now want more flexibility in their 
exchange rates.4 But there is more uncertainty after the crisis regarding the 
duration of the inflows. Some of the inflows may be arbitraging response to short-
term interest rates that exceed world rates, or speculative anticipations of 
revaluation, or temporary portfolio adjustments following liberalization in many 
countries. There are fears of their possible reversal leading to precautionary 
reserve accumulation. Therefore willingness to allow some exchange rate 
appreciation and absorb more inflows is linked to reduction in the risk associated 
with these inflows. While more flexible exchange rates can contribute to it, this 
reduction also depends on changes in local, regional and global institutions. Better 
institutions for regional cooperation will reduce the possibility of a coordination 
failure where one country suddenly switches away from holding dollar reserves 
because it fears the other is going to, thus precipitating a crisis. Although 
heterogeneity is too large in Asia for an economic or monetary union to be 
possible, there is potential for greater coordination on select economic issues. But 
apart from coordination within Asia, international institutions are also required to 
facilitate dialogue between Asian and G-8 CBs and governments.  
The stylized facts developed further refute the revived Bretton Woods 
argument of fixed exchange rates, since many Asian exchange rates turn out to be 
appreciating. Intra-Asian trade is large and growing, so dependency on exports to 
the U.S. is declining. Many Asian EMEs have reached economic maturity and do 
not have surplus labor.  
But even in countries where exchange rates have appreciated against the 
dollar, the float is heavily managed, explaining the reserve accumulation. But the 
latter does not necessarily imply that exchange rates are overvalued, even if there 
is a trade surplus.5 For populous low per capita income Asian EMEs, the most 
                                                 
4 East Asian countries were regarded as miracle economies because of robust growth rates in a 
conservative fiscal environment. Financial weaknesses, such as high short-term foreign currency 
debt, were not suspected. Large outflows of foreign capital beginning in Thailand spread to 
Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. The currency crises turned into banking crises as the steep 
depreciation and spikes in interest rates bankrupted indebted businesses. Poor regulation and high 
interest differentials under fixed exchange rate regimes contributed to the over-borrowing abroad. 
5 An equilibrium exchange rate should imply a sustainable balancing of the current and the capital 
account of the BOP, over time.  This is compatible with a current account that is in deficit or in 
surplus for some periods of time. 
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important criterion on which to judge the adequacy of the exchange rate is 
probably not inflows or reserves, but robust export growth. The latter will help 
these countries to raise per capita incomes, remove poverty, and achieve a 
sustainable long-run balance of payments.  Exchange rates cannot bear the entire 
burden of capital account adjustment since that would adversely affect the current 
account of the balance of payments. But a high growth of exports can occur 
without a trade surplus. 
More flexible Asian exchange rates and mild relative appreciation, with 
supporting policies that sustain the global upturn, and lower the U.S. fiscal deficit, 
would be the most effective adjustment path. Since the U.S. has the largest trade 
deficit with China, some revaluation of the renminbi will help to correct the 
deficit. It will also allow more appreciation of other Asian exchange rates. Asian 
EMEs have benefited from global trade.  Preventing the dollar from crashing and 
preserving U.S. import demand is important for them; robust Asian growth, which 
expands their export market, is important for the U.S.  
Analysis of potential strategic actions between Asian EMEs is presented in 
section 2. The link between real wages and exchange rates and its implications for 
adjustment are explored in section 3. After a brief comparison of structure, 
macroeconomic policy and trade patterns across Asian EMEs, section 4 draws out 
implications of the analysis for global risk and obstacles to adjustment before 
section 5 concludes.   
 
POSSIBLE STRATEGIC ACTION 
We use prototype models with three agents, countries 1 and 2 and a 
representative market agent, to analyze the decision to sell or hold dollars in terms 
of strategic interactions between country pairs with matching reserve levels. This 
is a useful stylization since Asian countries with substantial foreign exchange 
reserves can be classified into three groups: Japan, China with high reserves, 
Korea, Singapore and India with medium reserves and Thailand and Malaysia 
with low reserves (see Table 5).6  Taiwan also has high reserves.  
Each country wants to minimize loss in the capital value of reserves. Its 
strategy is an action A = {S,H}, with S denoting sale of dollar reserves, and H the 
decision to continue to hold them. If both countries choose H, the dollar 
depreciates at the rate d1 determined by U.S. deficits. Therefore the capital loss 
for each country is d1 multiplied by the level of its dollar reserves r.  If both 
countries choose S, the market agent may also sell, and the dollar may depreciate 
                                                 
6 Table 5 reports total foreign exchange reserves. Not all of these are held in dollar assets. For 
example, the CBs of Japan and China together hold $900 billion, or 46 percent of foreign holdings 
of US Treasury securities. The Bank of Korea holds about $69 billion or 4 percent of the total 
foreign Treasury holdings. 
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at a higher rate d3. If one country sells and the other does not, the depreciation rate 
is d2. The loss for the country that continues to hold is d2 r and for the country that 
sells it is zd2r, where z, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1, is the proportion of its reserves the country is 
not able to sell prior to the higher rate of depreciation d2 occurring in the market 
period. The losses are summarized in Table 1. The parameters d satisfy the 
following restrictions: 0 ≤ d1 ≤ d2 ≤ d3. The inequalities follow because of the 
rising intensity of market reaction. We further assume that in the case of low 
reserves rL, d1 = d2 = dL < d3= dM. The market absorbs the sales if only one 
country sells without a higher rate of dollar depreciation, but if both sell, the rate 
of depreciation rises to equal dM, the rate of depreciation if one or both the 
medium reserve countries sell. Thus, in the case of medium reserves rM, d2 = d3 = 
dM. In the case one or more high reserve counties sell, the extreme market reaction 
triggered implies d2 = d3 = dH, dH > dM. 
 
Table 1: Loss in capital value of reserves 
Country 2 Country 1 
H S 
H d1 r1; d1 r2 d2 r1; zd2 r2  
S z d2 r1; d2 r2 d3 r1; d3 r2 
 
We define a critical value of z = z*, such that if z < z*, the losses to 
anyone country from deviating and choosing to sell dollars are lower than from 
continuing to hold dollars: z* = d1/ d2.  
If parameter z Є [0, z*) both countries choose strategy S leading to SS as 
the unique Nash equilibrium. This is the case of collective action failure where 
strategic action leads the countries inevitably to the outcome where an attack 
occurs on the dollar and both are worse off. Self-interest leads the countries to act 
against the common interest. For z Є (z*, 1] both HH and SS are equilibria, here a 
coordination failure can lead both countries to sell, but it is also possible that both 
continue to hold. 
The probability of SS being the unique Nash equilibrium is higher if d1 is 
higher, d2 is lower and a slow speed of market reaction makes z low. 
 Tables 2 to 4 calculate the losses and the equilibria (in bold) for the three 
groups of countries, under likely parameter values given in the table. The dollar is 
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assumed to depreciate at 5 percent7 under the hold strategy, so that d1 = 0.05. The 
market tolerates sales by one low reserve country but reacts to sales by both low 
reserve countries and by any other country. 
 
Table 2: Low dollar reserve countries, rL = 50 
Thailand Malaysia 
H S 
H d1 = 0.05 
2.5; 2.5 
dL = 0.05, z = 0, z* = 1 
2.5; 0 
S dL = 0.05, z = 0, z* = 1
0; 2.5 
dM = 0.1 
10; 10 
 
Under the assumption that z = 0 so that any one low reserve country can 
sell all its reserves without any market reaction, SS is the unique Nash 
Equilibrium for the low reserve countries. In the other cases, both SS and HH are 
equilibria. But a sale by the low reserve countries will result in a higher rate of 
depreciation, and may trigger a chain reaction coordinating on SS. On the other 
hand, since markets are nervous and react quickly to any sale of dollars by a CB 
or even the announcement of a future portfolio rebalancing, z may exceed z* even 
for low reserve countries, so that SS is no longer the unique Nash equilibrium.8 
For example, in Table 2, if dL rises to 0.07 and z to 0.8, which is higher than z* = 
0.71. SS is no longer the unique equilibrium.  
Nervousness of markets has two effects. It raises z, thus lowering any one 
country’s incentive to sell, so that SS is not the unique equilibrium, but it also 
makes coordination to SS more likely between the multiple equilibria SS and HH, 
since a small sale can spark a major and instant selling reaction. 
If a country with high reserves were to sell its dollar holdings, countries in 
the other two groups would follow; sales by the medium group would trigger 
sales by the low group but not necessarily the high group. If a critical mass of 
                                                 
7 The highest average annual rate of depreciation of the dollar against Asian currencies has been 
about 4 percent from Table 5. The rate was 5 percent against the Indian rupee in 2004, and 14 
percent against the Euro that year. The dollar has been depreciating since 2001. 
8 On Monday, the 21st of February 2005, the Korean CB said it planned to diversify more of its 
reserves into non-dollar assets. Markets reacted strongly. Sales by currency traders led to the worst 
single-day decline in two months against the yen and the euro for the dollar. Stock markets in New 
York, London, Paris and Frankfurt dropped, and gold and oil prices, shot up. The Koreans said the 
next day that they did not intend to sell their dollars, and the markets calmed down. 
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countries from the other two groups sold, it would become very expensive for the 
high reserve countries to abstain from doing so. For example, China would have 
to buy more and more dollars to maintain its dollar peg. 
 
Table 3: Medium dollar reserve countries rM = 100 
Singapore Korea 
H S 
H d1 = 0.05 
5; 5 
dM = 0.1, z = 0.6, z* = 0.5 
10; 6 
S dM = 0.1, z = 0.6, z* = 0.5
6;10 




Table 4: High dollar reserve countries rH = 500 
Japan China 
H S 
H d1 = 0.05 
25; 25 
dH = 0.5, z = 0.6, z* = 0.1 
250; 40 
S dH = 0.05, z = 0.6, z* = 0.1
40; 250 
dH = 0.5 
250; 250 
 
If the U.S. reduces its deficits and thus eventually lowers d1, it would 
increase confidence in the dollar. If Asian and G-8 governments and CBs talk to 
each other a coordination failure may be averted. Of course the analysis is 
simplified and is based only on economic loss. Countries will be factoring in 
many other factors such as, diplomatic pressures, the loss to trade following 
financial fragility, psychological factors such as “one upmanship,” “aggression,” 
“not wanting to be left behind or pushed.” Some of these can lower the 
probability of the attack equilibrium, but others make it more likely. Even so, the 
analysis does establish that on economic grounds, a unique sell equilibrium 




EXCHANGE RATE FLEXIBILITY AND RELATIVE WAGES 
 
In the debate two very different cures have been proposed as essential to 
improve the U.S. balance of payments deficit. The first is to reduce the U.S. fiscal 
deficit, the second to appreciate Asian EME exchange rates relative to the dollar 
sufficiently to compensate for their lower wages (Woolfolk 2004).9 The first puts 
the burden of adjustment on reduction in expenditure or absorption, the second 
relies on expenditure switching. The first implies that the U.S. must bear the brunt 
of direct adjustment costs; the second that Asian countries must make major 
moves. But there is a close link between real wages and real exchange rates. 
Rigidities in real wages over the medium-run may limit the range of movement of 
real exchange rates, suggesting that a third, balanced approach would be more 
effective.  
Beyond a point, wages in poorer Asian countries cannot rise unless 
productivity in agriculture rises, raising wage options for the average worker, or 
surplus labor is absorbed. Over appreciation of Asian currencies will only reduce 
their nominal wages and prices unless productivity rises in terms of their 
consumption basket.  
Politicians find it difficult to impose discipline on workers, since their 
votes are important.10 Thus U.S. workers or their unions may not accept a steep 
reduction in real wages, or may be unable to do so as world prices fall with U.S. 
import demand preventing real wages from falling. If Asian exchange rates do 
appreciate steeply, and export prices do not fall, a rise in the price of hitherto 
cheap imports from Asia will lower the real wages of low-end workers, raising 
inequality and social pressures in the U.S.11 But if real wages do not fall, and 
nominal wages rise to compensate for dollar depreciation, domestic inflation will 
appreciate the real dollar value over time. This feedback is low in the U.S. as 
nominal wages are sticky and there is a three-year lag between contractual 
revisions. As imports become more expensive, and other prices do not fall, 
inflation may rise, requiring a sharp rise in interest rates. This exporting of 
inflation is the reason appreciation in a trading partner’s currency has been 
                                                 
9 Willett (2004) points out that a third, balanced approach, with a combination of different possible 
types of adjustment is necessary. 
10 See Peterson (2004). I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that the US was unable to 
force real wages down except through a serious recession in the 70s. Large voting groups are a 
basic weakness for democracies. 
11 Although imports are not a large share of US output, the dominance of cheap Chinese goods in 
low end supermarkets suggests that they do form a large share of the consumption basket of the 
low income worker.   
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disliked.12  Possible wage adjustments give a range for the feasible real exchange, 
thus limiting the exchange rate as a means of adjustment.  
The Swan diagram is a useful analytical tool to explore this range and 
show the working of the real exchange rate and of absorption as the two means of 
adjustment.13  The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of traded to non-
traded (NT) goods prices. NT goods are important for BOP adjustment in small 
countries, which have to take world prices as given. U.S. imports or exports have 
a large share in world trade; world prices change with them, and this is another 
avenue of BOP adjustment available to the U.S. But NT goods also have a large 
share in the output of the U.S. economy and are a major determinant of real 
wages, so that this relative price is important in adjustment. The analysis would 
be unchanged if the terms of trade, or the ratio of imported to home produced 
goods, replaces the real exchange rate. There is less endogenous adjustment in the 
terms of trade for a small open economy. 
Consider two hypothetical countries, one with a deficit, the other with a 
surplus in the current account of the BOP. The surplus country represents China 
or India, and the U.S. is the deficit country. Habits impart persistence to real 
wages over the medium term. The deficit country has a high per capita income 
and the wage threshold is high, but productivity is also high. The threshold is 
consistent with full employment, and wages normally lie above and cannot fall 
below the threshold. Since the country accounts for a large part of global demand, 
even before the threshold is reached, world prices begin to fall with nominal 
wages, so that real wages stay above the threshold. The surplus country has a low 
per capita income. Productivity is low, the threshold is low, and employment is 
demand determined, with large numbers available for employment at the 
threshold and even below it in the short-run. Wages cannot rise above the 
threshold because workers in large numbers make themselves available for 
employment. There may also be an efficiency wage below this threshold wage. 
Productivity falls if wages fall below this point so that employers will not reduce 
wages to employ more workers at wages below that level. 
Figures 1 and 2 reproduce the Swan diagram and the underlying labor 
market equilibrium first for a country with a balance of payment deficit and then 
for a surplus country. In the part (i) of the figures, the curve depicting internal 
balance (IB) slopes downward. The combination of real exchange (Z) and 
                                                 
12 There are of course degrees of freedom, since our analysis ignores tariffs and is limited to the 
average worker. But the actual labor market is segmented, and wages can be very flexible in some 
segments. In the US airlines industry, for example, in the intense competitive shake out of 2004 
workers have taken up to a fifty per cent cut in nominal wages. But workers are looking for 
alternatives, and the fall in prices and wages is accompanied by a steep fall in quality of service--
flights are routinely delayed. In some segments migrant workers keep wages low.   
13 See Corden (2002) for an illuminating recent use of this model. 
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absorption (A) gives domestic demand, which determines the output level. 
Imports allow higher absorption, but for imports to rise at a given level of income 
Z must appreciate. The curve Yf gives the full employment level of income. The C 
curves depict the external balance (EB) for which the current account (B) must 
equal net exports (X-M). At a given current account output and imports can only 
rise if exports rise. The latter requires depreciation in Z, so the curves slope 
upwards. Initial equilibrium is on Co as surplus country reserves, invested in the 
deficit country treasury bonds, fund a current account deficit at an appreciated 
deficit country exchange rate. But the inflows are expected to shrink so that Co 
shifts up to C1, requiring adjustment. The full employment equilibrium point 
shifts from Q to B along Yf.  
 






















(a) Exchange Rate and Absorption  
 
Part (b) of figure 1 shows the corresponding labor market equilibrium. The labor 
demand curve D1, corresponding to the more depreciated exchange rate along C1, 
shifts down, from Do corresponding to Co. For the full employment level Nf to be 
maintained, real wages must fall from Q to B. If real wages are rigid employment 
will fall to G. If the labor supply curve (Ls) has a kink at some threshold level of 
real wages they will not fall below this. The real wage threshold sets an upper limit 
to the real exchange rate—it will not depreciate above that. In that case adjustment 
must be a mixture of switching and reduction in absorption. At the new equilibrium 
J on C1 there is some depreciation and fall in real wages, but also a reduction in 
output and employment. The latter could come through a fall in the fiscal deficit. A 
rise in labor productivity can make a further depreciation in the real exchange rate 
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 (b) Real Wages and Employment 
                               
In the surplus country, the initial equilibrium Q on Yo is at less than full 
potential employment. It is near the horizontal stretch of the labor supply curve, 
which gives an upper limit to real wages (Figure 2b). Reserve accumulation has 
limited absorption of foreign inflows along Co at the initial equilibrium Q. Some 
more inflows can be absorbed through an appreciation until H, the lower limit set 
to the real exchange rate by the upper limit on real wages. But shifting to C1 
requires a rise in employment and output to O. Although O is higher than the 
initial level Q, it is below the level G which could have been attained without the 
appreciation and rise in wages. Wages can rise if productivity rises for workers in 
agriculture so that their exit options improve, or the surplus labor available from 
the rural sector is absorbed in modern employment. There may be a kink in the 
labor demand curve below Q at an efficiency wage level—wages would not fall 
below this.14  
Therefore both countries share adjustment costs. There is some fall in 
employment in the deficit country but the surplus country also does not reach full 
employment. Continued high growth in the surplus country can serve as a positive 
demand shock for the deficit country’s exports, so that Y in Figure 1 shifts back to 
the full employment level Yf, as export demand rises.  
                                                 
14 Figure 2 does not apply to the more developed Asian countries such as Japan or South Korea or 
countries where labor in the traditional subsistence sectors has already shrunk.  
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Although the model is stylized, it suggests that large changes in the real 
exchange rate between China and the U.S. must await a change in relative 
productivity; but gradual adjustment is possible. Feasible adjustment in real 
wages and exchange rates may be sufficient to allow the15 % appreciation of the 
renminbi required to absorb foreign inflows equivalent to the 1 percent current 
account deficit ratio China has been running (Williamson (2003)). Determination 
of the exact figure requires an econometric model, but it is clear that price 
adjustment alone may not be sufficient, expenditure compression will also be 
required in the U.S. Adjustment has not only to be gradual, but also balanced. 
 
ASIAN INTEGRATION, TRADE AND RISK REDUCTION: STYLIZED 
FACTS 
 
A picture of similarities and differences in structure and monetary policy 
across Asia, helps to assess the possibilities of adjustment, coordination of 
macroeconomic policy, collective action and risk reduction. Table 5 presents 
indicators of output, growth, openness, fiscal and monetary policy for China, 
Japan, India, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Except for forex reserves, which are for end 2004, the 
figures are four-year averages over 2000-03 (see footnotes to Table 5). 
The table shows a large heterogeneity in levels of development, per capita 
incomes, degree of openness, and macroeconomic policy across Asian countries. 
Geographic and population diversity also exists; China and India are large 
countries, with populations exceeding 1 billion. 
Their per capita incomes were lower, but both seem to be catching-up with 
the other countries since the two have the highest rates of GDP growth. Reserves 
have historically been high for Japan, they crossed a hundred billion dollars from 
the mid-nineties for China, but other Asian EMEs started accumulating large 
reserves after the 1997 crisis, so the reserves may be fulfilling a precautionary 
role. Although the renminbi is tightly fixed to the dollar, other Asian currencies 
appreciated somewhat. There were wide ranges in growth rates and ratios for 
inflation and interest rates, FDI inflows, narrow money and domestic credit 
created by the banking sector. The two South Asian countries had domestic credit 
to GDP ratios of around 0.5, while in China and Japan they were almost three 
times as much. Most Asian EMEs had relatively conservative fiscal policies and 
ran a surplus on the BOP current account. The diversity suggests that they do not 







Table 5: Descriptive statistics and Asian heterogeneity 
 China Hong Kong India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore 
Sri 
Lanka Thailand
Real Per Capita 
Income 955.48 24356.68 462.13 667.39 34382.4 10635.5 3897.9 875.39 16316.4 748 1985.6 
Output Growth 
Rates 8.94 0.84 6.01 3.86 -0.90 4.62 3.39 4.60 0.44 3.06 4.81 
Reserves   ($ 
billion) 514.54 121.50 113.81 19.40 819.14 152.00 54.63 15.87 110.10 0.35 45.98 
FDI  ($ billion) 44.76 27.23 3.32 -1.99 7.44 4.61 2.52 1.11 12.35 0.19 2.52 
Rate of 
Depreciation 0.00 -0.14 -0.77 -3.65 -1.67 -1.76 0.00 3.59 3.88 5.55 -2.82 
Inflation 0.41 -3.58 3.66 8.05 -1.73 2.88 1.41 3.85 -0.53 8.62 1.64 
Interest rate 2.97 2.85 6.69 7.76 0.05 4.53 2.73 8.68 1.57 15.14 1.76 
Exports to GDP 0.26 1.52 0.09 0.37 0.10 0.10 1.01 0.48 1.47 0.30 0.56 







0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.19 -0.01 0.09 -0.08 0.07 
Fiscal Deficit   
(-) or Surplus to 
GDP 
-0.03 NA -0.05 0.00 NA NA NA -0.05 0.04 -0.10 -0.01 
Credit Growth 
Rate 20.84 0.22 12.42 5.30 1.22 13.78 6.90 4.78 2.85 10.54 1.52 
Narrow Money 
Growth 16.62 21.02 12.89 11.16 13.89 11.86 9.49 10.35 5.28 11.06 9.20 
Domestic Credit 
to GDP 1.54 1.44 0.56 0.61 1.52 0.91 1.18 0.58 0.84 0.44 1.02 
Narrow Money 
to GDP 0.67 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.62 0.09 0.25 0.12 0.23 0.09 0.13 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund Online, 
http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/
Notes: 1.Reserves for all countries are from October 2004, except for Sri Lanka (2002) and 
Indonesia (2002). 
2.Except for reserves all other variables are four-year average figures (2000 to 2003) for all 
countries. 
3.For India FDI and current account balance on goods and services to GDP are averaged 
over 2000 to 2003, and deficit to GDP is the average of 2000-2001. 
4.For Indonesia deficit to GDP is only the 1992 index. 
5.For Malaysia FDI and current account balance on goods and services to GDP are averaged 
over 2000 to 2003. 
6.For Sri Lanka deficit to GDP is averaged for two years, 2000–2001. 
7.Bank rate is used as the interest rate for China, and India. For the rest money market rate is 
used as the interest rate. 
8.Narrow money is the stock of narrow money comprising transferable deposits and 
currency outside deposit banks (line "34...ZF" in the IFS data set). 
9.Domestic credit, from the banking survey, of the IFS measures the claims of the banking 




But are there possibilities of coordination on select economic issues? 
There are as yet no formal institutions for economic coordination, but the Asian 
currency crisis and the success of the EU, are pushing Asian EMEs to make 
initiatives towards that goal. A number of common shocks ranging from SARS to 
bird flu to the tidal waves have underlined the importance of regular 
communication and coordination. The ADB serves as an informal secretariat for 
discussions; China, Japan and Korea have set up a task force to explore issues in 
more cooperation; there is the Chiangmai initiative for reserve sharing and swaps, 
although the more difficult matter of surveillance has yet to be tackled; there are 
also attempts to set up an Asian Bond Fund to enhance financial integration. 
Although there are 49 Asian countries, ten Southeast Asian countries15 have long 
had a fora for dialogue in ASEAN.  This has been expanded to include other 
major Asian countries. ASEAN aims to establish an economic community by 
2020. A free trade area between China and ASEAN is targeted for 2010. 
Milestones include a non-aggression accord, and an accord on mechanisms to 
settle trade disputes. Similar accords with other countries are on the anvil. Thus 
although there is a history of discord and distrust in the region more systematic 
dialogue has been started. To that extent a coordination failure resulting in an exit 
from the dollar is less likely. 
Are Asian EMEs ready to move to more flexible exchange rate regimes? 
Table 6 calculates average exchange and interest rate volatility for 24 countries 
over the period 1995-2002. The countries are divided into a set of four East Asian 
EMEs, a set of other EMEs with mixed exchange rate regimes, and a set of 
mature small open economies with independent floats to serve as benchmarks16. 
Most EMEs have moved to more flexible exchange rates after the 1997 crisis, 
realizing the high risk associated with fixed exchange rate regimes. The post crisis 
exchange rate volatility is higher. Partly the volatility has risen as countries have 
attempted to reduce and smoothen interest rates. Interest volatility also fell for 
most countries and it is lower than exchange rate volatility although the latter is 
                                                 
15 Six core ASEAN members are Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and 
Brunei. Poorer nations that have joined the group are Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. 
China, Japan, South Korea and India send representatives to the annual meeting, making it 
ASEAN + 4 or JACIK. Australia and New Zealand were invited to join the summit meeting for 
the first time in 2004. The US sends a representative. (News reports and a presentation by 
Ramkishen Rajan sponsored by the Freeman Foundation, Claremont Graduate University.)  
16 Exchange rate volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of monthly movements 
(percentage changes) of domestic nominal exchange rates against the US dollar, and interest rate 
volatility as the standard deviation of monthly money market interest rate differences. For some 
EMEs where this is not available the nearest short-term substitute interest rate is used. The 
calculations for the individual countries are available from the author on request. The countries are 
listed in the footnote to the table. 
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also bounded. The move to more flexibility implies that Asian EMEs are more 
ready to allow limited floating against the dollar. 
 
Table 6: Average interest and exchange rate volatility (standard deviations) 
Year East Asia 4 9 EMEs with mixed 
exchange rate regimes 
10 Mature Small Open 
Economies with 
Independent Floats 
















1995 0.76 1.61 1.97 3.52 2.94 1.20 
1996 0.50 1.15 1.23 1.83 1.86 0.67 
1997 9.00 6.24 1.80 1.88 2.37 0.43 
1998 16.01 5.36 2.55 2.45 3.39 0.89 
1999 4.42 1.17 3.97 1.37 2.17 0.42 
2000 3.15 0.73 2.43 1.09 3.00 0.36 
2001 3.75 1.36 3.39 1.61 3.07 0.34 
2002 0.49 0.11 2.53 1.30 1.43 0.29 
Source: Calculated from International Financial Statistics, yearbooks 1995-2001, (IMF, 2002) 
May. 
Notes: 1.Data for 2002 is till May 2002. 
2.The four East Asian EMEs are Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand; 9 EMEs are 
Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Israel, Poland, Singapore, and Turkey; 10 Mature 
Small Open Economies are Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, South 
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK. 
 
What impact will changes in relative exchange rates have on trade? 
Historically Asian trade and financial integration has been deeper with the West 
than within Asia. Therefore Asian EMEs are considered to be trade competitors 
for the same western markets.17  But the structure of trade is changing rapidly. 
The matrix tables 7 and 8 give exports and imports respectively between 11 Asian 
countries and the U.S. The figures are ratios since they are divided by each 
countries total export or import and then averaged over the four years 2000-03. 
Comparing the last row of these tables shows that the discrepancy between the US 
exports to and imports from China is very wide, and is much larger than that for 
any other Asian EME. While 10.36 percent of U.S. imports come from China, 
only 3 percent of its total exports go to China. Therefore depreciation of the dollar 
against the renminbi will make more of a contribution towards resolving the U.S. 
current account deficit than will the dollar’s depreciation against other Asian 
countries. Moreover, U.S. exports tend to be higher to those Asian EMEs with 
                                                 
17 Trade is growing rapidly between China and the ten ASEAN countries and by 2004 almost 
equaled that between ASEAN and the US. 
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high per capita incomes. Therefore more than an appreciation of their currencies, 
high Asian growth may contribute more to raising U.S. exports to Asia. 
   




China Hong Kong India 
Indo




pore Sri Lanka 
Thai
land USA
China 0 17.68 0.73 1.09 15.51 4.65 1.29 0.63 2.16 0.14 0.89 21.01
Hong 
Kong 38.44 0 0.74 0.45 5.57 2.10 0.93 1.04 2.13 0.18 1.03 21.40
India 3.32 5.74 0 1.46 3.67 1.21 1.59 0.65 2.74 1.79 1.41 21.20
Indonesia 4.89 2.22 2.20 0 22.31 6.95 3.42 1.41 9.53 0.28 1.98 13.13
Japan 8.88 6.00 0.49 1.56 0 6.76 2.70 2.05 3.69 0.08 3.10 28.93
Korea 13.88 6.58 1.01 1.97 10.27 0 1.94 1.75 2.75 0.19 1.28 20.20
Malaysia 4.98 5.41 2.05 1.89 12.22 3.27 0 1.53 17.26 0.25 4.08 20.59
Philippines 3.52 6.36 0.23 0.58 15.58 3.48 4.70 0 7.41 0.02 3.52 26.13
Singapore 7.05 12.11 2.86  Na 9.75 5.31 23.05 3.24 0 0.44 5.86 20.87
Sri 
Lanka 0.18 1.18 2.61 0.15 3.52 0.66 0.17 0.11 1.39 0 0.55 39.79
Thailand 5.19 5.21 0.79 2.29 14.91 1.92 4.39 1.80 8.15 0.23 0 19.84
USA 2.95 1.87 0.57 0.35 7.71 3.30 1.42 1.08 2.33 0.02 0.79 0 
Source: Calculated from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, UN 2004. 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/
 
Comparing the last columns of the two matrices demonstrates that exports to the 
U.S. are a large percentage of each country’s exports, but imports from the U.S. 
are not as large a share of each country’s imports.  The summary table 9 shows 
this again. It is calculated from tables 7 and 8 by adding up first the export shares 
for each Asian country to every other Asian country and dividing the total by its 
export share going to the U.S. The second column of the table does the same 









China Hong Kong India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia
Philippi
nes Singapore Sri Lanka Thailand USA
China 0 3.60 0.77 1.62 18.02 10.01 2.88 1.04 2.32 0.01 1.98 9.54
Hong Kong 43.62 0 1.24 0.73 11.63 4.88 2.43 1.28 4.73 0.03 1.78 6.17
India 4.41 1.74 0 2.32 3.75 2.67 2.52 0.18 2.75 0.16 0.76 6.81
Indonesia 7.20 0.83 1.80 0 14.57 5.82 3.35 0.39 11.82 0.02 3.88 9.30
Japan 17.31 0.41 0.64 4.31 0 4.95 3.57 1.89 1.55 0.06 3.01 17.84
Korea 10.27 1.07 0.73 3.12 19.66 0 2.75 1.19 2.25 0.03 1.08 15.82
Malaysia 6.43 2.74 0.89 3.14 18.87 4.82 0 3.00 12.71 0.01 4.11 16.18
Philippines 3.53 4.17 0.84 2.31 19.82 6.92 3.47 0 6.47 0.01 3.10 18.14
Singapore 9.40 3.31 1.31 na 18.62 4.86 23.30 3.04 0 0.05 5.95 20.09
Sri Lanka 4.07 8.45 12.17 2.47 5.89 5.45 3.51 0.13 7.18 0 2.50 4.13
Thailand 6.49 1.40 1.09 2.22 23.95 3.61 5.49 1.81 4.87 0.07 0 11.08
USA 10.36 0.83 0.96 0.87 10.65 3.10 2.03 0.98 1.32 0.16 1.31 0 
Source: Calculated from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, UN (2004) 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/
 
The table shows that intra Asian trade among the 11 countries is already 
large compared to their trade with the U.S. Except for Sri Lanka, intra Asian 
exports exceed exports to the U.S.; the ratios are above 1. The import ratios are 
far larger, implying that intra-Asian imports far exceed those from the U.S. The 
average export ratio is 2.1 and import ratio is 5.1; on average, these economies are 
exporting twice as much to each other, as they do to the U.S. It must be noted that 
the data in the tables covers only commodity trade, which is all that is available in 
the UN database. The boom in software exports is also not captured since services 
are not included in the database. Moreover, a large part of Asian trade is from 
trade in inputs, which is not captured in final trade data (Jones et. al. 2004). Such 
trade is complementary rather than competitive. Therefore intra Asian trade is 
even larger than the tables show. As Asian EMEs grow, find their comparative 
advantage and form markets for each other, intra-Asian trade will further increase, 
much as intra-industry trade dominates in developed country trade. 
China has a current account deficit with Asian EMEs but a surplus with 
the U.S., although the deficits are partly due to large raw materials imports. Thus 
even if China appreciates against the dollar, and other Asian EMEs do not follow 
fully, it will gain a major supply-side advantage due to cheaper imports from 
these countries. By the same logic, these Asian EMEs may not want their 
currencies to depreciate against China and other Asian EMEs since their imports 
would become more expensive. Although inflation remains low, China’s rapid 
 20 
 
output growth has raised fears of overheating, and in 2004 China raised its one-
year lending interest rate from 5.31% to 5.58%, for the first time in nine years. 
Some appreciation of its exchange rate could contribute towards lowering costs 
and alleviating supply-side bottlenecks. 
 
Table 9: Intra-Asian trade (2000-2003) compared to each country’s trade 
with the US 
 Export ratios Import ratios 
 Ratio of average share of total 
country exports going to 10 
Asian countries divided by 
average share of total country 
exports going to US 
Ratio of average share of total 
country imports coming from 
10 Asian countries divided by 
average share of imports 


































Source: Calculated from Tables 7 and 8 
 
What impact will more flexible exchange rates have on risk? Reducing 
risk of crises and making the financial system more robust is the other chief 
concern of Asian EMEs. Reducing risk is necessary for reducing the 
precautionary holding of reserves. Limited exchange rate flexibility can help 
achieve this aim. In regressions for eleven Asian EMEs, the growth of banking 
sector net foreign assets on the mean deviations and on the squared mean 
deviation, of each country’s exchange rate, including macroeconomic control 
variables, growth of the net foreign assets falls with the distance of the exchange 
rate from its mean value but rises with flexibility in the exchange rates (Goyal and 
Agarwal, 2005). The results imply that limited exchange rate flexibility increases 
banks net foreign assets thus providing more cover and hedging the risk 
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associated with foreign borrowing. The risk is higher with pegged exchange rates, 
and also rises with the distance of other Asian EMEs exchange rates from the 
renminbi. Thus flexibility has to be limited, and unless China leaves its tight link 
to the dollar a major change in the level of other Asian exchange rates will raise 
risk in the region. The regressions suggest that an implicit alignment of Asian 
exchange rates exists. 
Country initiatives, improvements in global financial architecture, and 
regional arrangements can all reduce risk. Strengthening of regional and global 
initiatives will make countries more willing to appreciate and absorb capital 
inflows, thus allowing co to shift towards c1 (Figure 1), instead of accumulating 
reserves. Regional arrangements can also minimize the possibility of an exit from 
the dollar where one country stops holding dollar reserves because it believes the 
other is going to do so, but dialogue between high reserve Asian EMEs and the 
major developed countries is also required. 
Chinese concerns are that without full capital account convertibility it is 
difficult to know the real demand for the currency or the equilibrium value of the 
renminbi; a large part of the inflows may be speculative due to expected 
appreciation and may reverse after the appreciation; it does not want to expose its 
weak banks to potential financial instability; the stability of the renminbi 
contributed to the de-escalation of the Asian crises and large movements in it 
could destabilize Asian currencies again; export growth is necessary to absorb 
their still large reserves of labor. China is running a deficit with many Asian 
countries, and its commitments under WTO may reduce existing surpluses.18  
China wants to wait for its financial markets to deepen before moving to 
floating exchange rates, but limited exchange rate flexibility will contribute to 
deepening financial markets. Since China set up its first interbank currency 
market (the Foreign Exchange Trade System) in 1994, there has been sufficient 
forex market development to move forward. India is an example of a country that 
has successfully moved to a managed float even without full capital account 
convertibility.19 Integrating more fully with world markets has to be done in 
stages to lower risk. Limited exchange rate flexibility can come before fuller 
convertibility on the capital account, which can follow after financial markets 
deepen and mature.  
                                                 
18 The Chinese premier Wen Jiabao reiterated this position at a news conference on the 14th 
March 2005. He said China is making progress in foreign exchange reforms and more changes 
might come unexpectedly. But immediate changes might cause financial turmoil, damage the 
country's frail banking and financial industries, derail the growth process and hurt the poor. These 
points are based on newspaper reports and discussions with Chinese and other economists. 
19 Barry Eichengreen remarked that China can learn from India how to have a flexible exchange 
rate without full capital account convertibility at a 2005 conference at Berkeley. I thank Dr. 
Willett for this information. The latter also pointed out China will not make a capital loss on its 






Analysis of the strategic incentives of high reserve countries suggests that 
there is a possibility of a coordination failure, but a collective action failure is 
unlikely. The latter requires the existence of a unique outcome where everyone 
sells dollar reserves. The probability of such an outcome rises if the rate of dollar 
depreciation is higher, any one country selling reserves does not affect the rate 
much, and the speed of market reaction to a sale is low. We find that although a 
unique sell equilibrium is unlikely, multiple equilibria do exist so that an attack on 
the dollar remains a possibility.  Therefore it is necessary both to initiate efforts at 
explicit coordination and to begin gradual adjustment of global imbalances.  
The adjustment has to be gradual since a large one-sided adjustment is not 
feasible. Adjustment in real wages and relative prices of deficit or surplus 
countries (expenditure switching) or a reduction in incomes and absorption in 
deficit countries and a rise in surplus countries, can both contribute to reducing 
global imbalances. For U.S. current account deficits to fall either its exchange rate 
must fall relative to others, or its absorption must fall. A real depreciation, 
however, cannot occur unless real wages fall in the U.S. and rise elsewhere.  
Nominal wage rigidity in the U.S. implies that depreciation can reduce 
real wages. Changes in relative price make expenditure switching to NT goods 
possible. But there are limits to real depreciation, since a large depreciation will 
eventually provoke a rise in nominal wages and inflation. Over time the 
depreciation is less effective. Moreover, a large U.S. dollar depreciation will 
lower world export demand and reduce world prices, thus preventing equivalent 
real depreciation. A sharp depreciation will also reduce the dollar’s attraction as a 
reserve currency and may trigger a cumulative exit from the dollar. Therefore a 
mixture of strategies is required--some depreciation, fiscal correction which 
would reduce absorption, but with incentives kept in place to encourage 
innovations and productivity improvements which have been a major source of 
U.S. growth.  
Unless the productivity of labor rises in Asian traditional sectors with 
surplus labor so that the flat segment of the labor supply curve shifts up, or low 
productivity labor is absorbed, so that equilibrium is now on the upward sloping 
segment of the labor supply curve, a steep appreciation will not raise real wages 
but only lower prices. Therefore appreciation alone is not an effective tool to 
correct the wage differential that is giving Asian EMEs a trade advantage.  
Since the chief deficit and surplus countries constitute the engine that is 
driving current global growth, an adjustment path that maintains and uses this 
growth would be most effective. The surplus countries need to raise their per 
capita incomes and absorb more labor in productive modern employment. Their 
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currencies should appreciate somewhat, in tandem, but more emphasis should be 
on maintaining demand and growth. This would raise demand for U.S. exports, 
which go more to high per capita income countries and those with a modern 
service sector.       
Dollar depreciation will be more effective in reducing U.S. deficits if the 
Chinese currency appreciates somewhat against the dollar. Although many Asian 
currencies have been appreciating, the appreciation would be less risky if the 
Chinese currency also appreciates, so that Asian currencies are able to retain risk-
minimizing alignments with the renminbi. Limited flexibility of the renminbi 
from a change to a multiple-currency basket peg would actually reduce risk and 
instability in Asia and enhance the degree of flexibility of Asian currencies. This 
would encourage the development of forex and financial markets, which is a 
major objective for China and other countries in the region.  
The logic of minimizing financial risk implies that the currencies would 
appreciate along with the renminbi to maintain optimal alignments so that China 
would not loose competitive advantage in Asia. To the extent Asian EMEs are 
trade competitors this should make adjustment of the renminbi easier.  But other 
non-competitive types of intra-Asian trade are large and growing, so that effects 
on competition should not be the major consideration. 
Stimulating trade requires a competitive exchange rate, but lowering 
financial risk requires some exchange rate flexibility. The latter makes some 
limited adjustment in relative exchange rates feasible, but removing global 
imbalances will also require continued impetus to global demand. 
China’s 2 percent revaluation in July 2005 is a vote for gradual 
adjustment; supporting adjustment from the U.S. will encourage it to continue in 
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